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Abstract 
Explanations regarding the etiology of mental health difficulties have been found to affect 
public attitudes towards those who experience such difficulties. Utilizing a large, 
randomized parallel-groups design (N = 1,004), we examined how standardized 
differential explanations of voice-hearing influence public attitudes, attributions, and 
behavioral intentions towards voice-hearers. Additionally, we incorporated a behavioral 
outcome measure to examine whether reported behavioral intentions towards voice-hearers 
were related to responses towards an individual with a history of voice-hearing. Consistent 
with attribution theory, mediated pathways between attributions and intentions were 
identified: broadly, viewing the voice-hearer’s behavior as dangerous, within their 
personal responsibility, and global was associated with more coercive intentions – and 
these were mediated by feelings of fear, anger, and pity. Reported behavioral intentions 
demonstrated small-to-moderate associations with our behavioral outcome measure. The 
findings suggest that explanations regarding the etiology of mental health difficulties that 
seek to reduce public attributions of dangerousness, personal responsibility, and globality 
may facilitate more helpful responses towards voice-hearers. 
 




Epidemiological studies suggest that voice-hearing is a relatively common 
experience in the general population, with prevalence rates reported to be around 10% 
(Beavan et al., 2011; Johns et al., 2002; Tien, 1991). Despite this, within Western 
societies, voice-hearing is popularly perceived (however inaccurately)to be aberrant and 
extraordinary (Beavan and Read, 2010; Leudar and Thomas, 2000) and associated with 
mental illness (Moskowitz et al., 2011) – most commonly, schizophrenia (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013; Jorm and Griffiths, 2008) – irrespective of whether 
the experience of voice-hearing causes distress or impairment of functioning.  
Contemporary medical explanations broadly emphasize the role of biological 
and/or genetic factors (e.g., disease of the brain; changes in brain structure; heritability) in 
the etiology of schizophrenia (ecological factors are increasingly attended to within these 
explanations, but biological/genetic factors tend to receive greater emphasis). However, 
biological and genetic factors alone are insufficient to explain the idiographic complexity 
of voice-hearing phenomena. Individual voice-hearing experiences and voice-content do 
not appear random, and are often personally and culturally meaningful (e.g., Anthony, 
2004): suggesting that consideration of psychological development and social environment 
is important to understanding and working with voice-hearing experiences (National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence [NICE], 2010).   
Explanations that emphasize the role of psychosocial factors in the etiology and 
maintenance of voice-hearing underpin a number of contemporary evidence-based 
approaches to working with distress or impairment that may arise in relation to voice-
hearing experiences(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence [NICE], 2010)
1
. 
Contemporary evidence-based approaches commonly invoke the stress-vulnerability 
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 We acknowledge that there is a multiplicity of psychological and sociological explanations of voice-
hearing, some of which are associated with particular therapeutic approaches and supportive interventions 
(Hayward et al., 2014). We focus here on two explanatory frameworks underpinning current evidence-based 
approaches: stress-vulnerability and cognitive models. 
model (Zubin and Spring, 1977) as a potential biopsychosocial explanation for the onset of 
voice-hearing (Garety, 2003): suggesting that voice-hearing experiences emerge from an 
interaction between stressful circumstances/contexts (including familial) and underlying 
vulnerability or propensity factors (which may include biological or organismic features).   
Cognitive explanations of voice-hearing have highlighted ways in which appraisal 
biases may lead people to ‘hear’ thoughts as independent voices (Bentall, 1990) or 
misattribute their inner-speech (Morrison and Haddock, 1997). These explanations also 
implicate potential source-monitoring difficulties (e.g., Morrison et al., 2003; Waters et al., 
2012) wherein the individual attributes internal experiences to external phenomena. 
Broadly, these cognitive accounts emphasize that voice-hearing has continuities with wider 
cognitive experience: they offer a normalizing explanation of etiology and place greater 
emphasis on adaptation to the experience of voice-hearing. In terms of cognitive 
approaches to adaptation, the model of Chadwick and Birchwood (1994) has been 
prominent (Thomas et al., 2014). This model suggests that the emotional and behavioral 
consequences of voice-hearing are influenced by the voice-hearer’s beliefs about the 
voices (their identity, intention, and power) and perceived self-efficacy – which may relate 
to broader beliefs about the self and others (Birchwood et al., 2004). 
Further to the (biological and psychosocial) explanations that underpin 
contemporary evidence-based approaches to understanding and working with voice-
hearing, such experiences are conceptualized as a spiritual or religious phenomenon in 
some cultures and communities. For example, in South Africa, Xhosa people who hear 
voices are supported to become indigenous healers (Sodi, 1995, cited in Thomas and 
Leudar, 1996). Although spiritual/religious accounts of voice-hearing are diverse, from 
this perspective, the origin and maintenance of voice-hearing can be broadly understood as 
selective direction and communication from a higher being or spiritual entity – or as an 
individual having special receptivity to such messages (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013). 
Spiritual understandings represent just one ‘alternative’ to the biological and psychosocial 
models that dominate professional discourse and practice in Western cultures: Voice-
hearers draw on a diverse range of explanations for their voice-hearing experiences, and 
this diversity is explicitly respected and validated by the international Hearing Voices 
Movement, which explicitly encourages individuals to develop their own explanatory 
framework as ‘experts by experience’ (Corstens et al., 2014). 
The explanations used to make sense of voice-hearing experiences may have 
important implications for how: (a) the general public understands and responds to voice-
hearers, (b) mental health professionals work with voice-hearers, and (c) voice-hearers 
make sense of their voice-hearing experiences (Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014). In particular, the 
way we explain voice-hearing may impact on the social stigma experienced by those who 
hear voices – i.e., how the broader community relates and responds to voice-hearers. 
Individuals perceived to have mental health difficulties are often marginalized, socially 
excluded, and considered dangerous by others, particularly when their voice-hearing is 
interpreted as a symptom of schizophrenia (Angermeyer and Dietrich, 2006). It would 
seem that mental health professionals are also susceptible to holding stigmatizing attitudes 
towards those with mental health difficulties (e.g., Magliano et al., 2004; Schulze and 
Angermeyer, 2003) with research indicating that these attitudes can influence the use of 
coercive treatments and segregation (Rao et al., 2009). 
Claims have been made that medical conceptualizations should reduce stigma 
towards ‘mental illness’ by highlighting that ‘illnesses’ are outside the control and 
responsibility of the individual (Angermeyer et al., 2011). However, research examining 
the influence of differential explanations regarding the etiology and maintenance of 
‘mental illness’ on public attitudes towards those deemed to be ‘mentally ill’ has produced 
mixed results. For example, some authors (e.g., Angermeyer et al., 2004; Lincoln et al., 
2008; Read, 2007) report that biological/medical explanations of mental illness increase 
stigma by eliciting attributions of dangerousness, in turn leading to fearful emotional 
responses and social-exclusionary intentions (Corrigan, 2000; Corrigan and Shapiro, 
2010). Similarly, Dietrich et al. (2004) found that people report a greater desire for social 
distance when understanding schizophrenia to be caused by biological factors. However, in 
a recent meta-analysis, Kvaale, Haslam, and Gottidiener (2013) found that biological 
explanations of ‘mental illness’ did not affect reported social distancing, but did induce 
pessimistic attitudes and elevate perceptions of dangerousness. 
Given the negative consequences of stigmatization, it is important to consider how 
public attitudes towards voice-hearers might operate and be influenced. Attribution theory 
provides a useful framework for understanding this process (e.g., Weiner, 1979, 1980, 
1985, 1995; Weiner et al., 1976). Within attribution theory, attitudes are understood to 
incorporate three linearly-related components: cognitions (attributions), emotions, and 
behavioral intentions (e.g., Reber and Reber, 1995). An attribution is a cognitive process 
through which individuals make sense of events, behaviors, and the world around them. 
These attributions are posited to influence emotional responses, which in turn mediate 
behavioral intentions (e.g., Corrigan, 2000). For example, if we observe a person falling 
over, the way that we attribute the behavior will impact upon our feelings and intentions 
towards that person: if the behavior is attributed to be uncontrollable (e.g., physical 
disability), related to an internal locus of causality (e.g., biological condition), outside of 
the individual’s personal responsibility (e.g., hereditary), and stable over time (e.g., long-
term condition), we may feel sympathy and wish to help that person (e.g., Corrigan, 2000; 
Weiner, 1995). In contrast, if we view that person’s behavior as controllable, within their 
personal responsibility, and unstable (e.g., they are acutely intoxicated) we may experience 
wariness and keep our distance (e.g., Corrigan, 2000; Weiner, 1995). In addition to the 
attributions outlined above (controllability, personal responsibility, locus of causality, and 
stability) attributions of globality (versus specificity) – i.e., whether behaviors or events 
are seen to be situationally-specific or constant across all situations (Abramson et al., 
1978) – are also considered to be influential determinants of attitudes.  
Further to these commonly-recognized attributions, a recent systematic literature 
review concluded that people frequently make attributions that individuals with a ‘mental 
illness’ are dangerous (Jorm et al., 2012), leading to reported avoidance of such 
individuals, and a preference for coercive treatments and segregation (Corrigan et al., 
2003; Link et al., 1999). Figure 1 provides an overview of the attribution model, 
incorporating core attributions and components discussed above.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The way people respond to individuals who have experiences that are commonly 
associated with mental illness – such as voice-hearing – thus appears to be influenced by 
the particular attributions that they hold. Given this, it is important to understand these 
attributions t and whether they are sensitive to differing explanatory frameworks. By 
examining public attitudes towards voice-hearers, and how these might be modified, we 
can further our understanding of how best to reduce discrimination, increase social 
inclusion, and promote more positive consideration and support towards those who have 
these experiences. 
In this study, our primary aim was to examine public attitudes and attributions in 
relation to voice-hearing, and how differential explanations of voice-hearing (biological, 
psychosocial [cognitive-behavioral], biopsychosocial, spiritual/religious) influence 
attributions and intentions towards voice-hearers. Further to being the first study to 
examine public attitudes towards voice-hearing, the current study was designed to address 
a number of limitations recognized in previous vignette-based applications of attribution 
theory in this area. For example, we include a control (no explanation) vignette, 
overcoming acknowledged weaknesses of recent investigations in this area (Bannatyne and 
Abel, 2015; Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014); active vignettes are matched for length and 
readability; we use multiple ‘psychosocial’ explanations, predicated on models 
underpinning current evidence-based interventions (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence [NICE], 2010), and include a non-mental health (religious/spiritual) 
explanation; and finally, we incorporate a novel behavioral outcome measure (see method 
section below) to triangulate self-reported behavioral intentions towards a voice-hearer. 
Although various features of the study were novel, we based our hypotheses on findings of 
a recent meta-analysis examining effects of biogenetic explanations on public responses 
towards individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Kvaale et al., 2013). We 
specifically predicted that, relative to other explanations, biogenetic explanations would be 
associated with (1) lower attributions of personal responsibility, (2) higher attributions of 
dangerousness, and (3) less helpful (more avoidant) intentions. 
The secondary aim of this research was to provide a large-scale test of the 
attribution theory model, as applied to public attitudes towards voice-hearers: Specifically, 
we wanted to examine whether (and how) participant attributions influence emotional 
responses, and whether these emotional responses in turn mediate their behavioral 
intentions towards voice-hearers. This is the first study to specifically examine the 
attribution theory model in relation to voice-hearing. However, previous work has 
examined attribution theory in relation to vignettes depicting an individual with 
‘schizophrenia’ (Corrigan et al., 2015; Corrigan et al., 2003) and found support for a 
posited pathway by which attributions of personal responsibility lead to increased anger 
and decreased pity, which in turn lead to reduced willingness to help. There is also some 
evidence implicating attributions of dangerousness in avoidant and coercive tendencies 
towards individuals with schizophrenia, with fear as a mediating emotional response 
(Corrigan et al., 2015; Corrigan et al., 2003). Based on these previous findings, we 
hypothesized that there would be significant indirect pathways such that (1) personal 
responsibility is negatively associated with helping intentions, via increased anger and 
decreased pity and (2) dangerousness is negatively associated with helping intentions, via 
increased fear; we expected parallel (but inverse) relationships with coercive intentions. 
2. Methods 
We used a randomized, parallel-groups design, facilitated through a large-scale 
online survey incorporating snowball sampling via social media. Estimated effect-size for 
this study was based on findings from a meta-analysis by Kvaale et al. (2013). The authors 
examined differential effects of biological versus psychosocial explanations of psychiatric 
symptoms on attributions of personal responsibility. Analyzing across 11 studies (total 
sample size of 1,454) they found an overall difference of small-to-medium magnitude 
(equivalent to Cohen’s f = 0.198). An a priori power calculation indicated that, given the 
number of conditions in the current study (five), with an alpha-level of 0.05, a sample size 
of at least 310 (62 per condition) was required to provide sufficient power (80%) to detect 
an effect of similar magnitude. Factoring in Bonferroni corrections for multiple testing 
(i.e., an adjusted alpha-level of 0.004), the required sample size was 505 (101 per 
condition).  
2.1 Participants 
The study was open to all members of the general public aged 18 or over who were 
able to understand written English and access the internet (to complete the survey). We 
used snowball sampling techniques to recruit research participants. The researchers 
advertised the study online (via social media and research recruitment platforms) and via 
institutional and personal mailing lists; we encouraged participants to disseminate the 
invitation to others (by sharing the study link) who were in turn encouraged to disseminate 
further. In this way, recruitment expanded beyond the immediate networks of the 
researchers. Participants did not receive compensation for participation in the study, 
2.2 Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval was obtained from an institutional review board at the authors’ 
host institution. 
2.3 Materials 
2.3.1 Vignettes.  Vignettes have been the most commonly used approach in 
studying stigma towards those with perceived mental health difficulties (Link et al., 2004). 
The vignettes in this study described a male voice-hearer (‘John’). The description of the 
voice-hearer and characteristics of his voices remained consistent across the five vignettes, 
and did not include any diagnostic labels (all vignettes used in this study are provided 
verbatim in the Supplementary material).
2
 Crucially, each condition offered a different 
etiological explanation of John’s voice-hearing experience, with corresponding 
implications for managing the experience: (1) a biological explanation, indicating that his 
voice-hearing is caused by biogenetic factors, and can be managed with medication; (2) a 
cognitive-behavioral explanation, indicating that his voice-hearing is caused by a 
misattribution of inner speech, and that, if John is troubled by his voice-hearing 
experiences, he can learn to manage them by changing the way he thinks about and 
responds to them (through Cognitive Behavioral Therapy); (3) a biopsychosocial 
explanation, indicating that his voice-hearing is caused by genetic and biological 
susceptibility to stress, and can be managed through interventions that reduce exposure to 
stress; (4) a non-mental-health-related explanation, which frames his voice-hearing 
experience within a spiritual and/or religious context, and can be managed through 
spiritual guidance and support; and (5) a non-explanatory control condition. 
The vignettes were developed by the three authors (clinical psychologists) in 
conjunction with an external clinical psychologist who specializes in working with voice-
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 Labelling was excluded to minimise extra-conceptualisation influences on responding to the vignettes: 
Previous research has shown that use of diagnostic labels can elicit more negative responses (Lincoln et al., 
2008). 
hearers. Vignettes were designed to ensure that all explanatory conditions were matched 
for word length and readability (e.g., Flesch scores; Klare, 1974). Additionally, vignettes 
were checked for face validity by a voice-hearing service-user from a local service-user 
involvement panel. 
Stigma can be seen to comprise tendencies to (1) blame individuals for their 
situation, (2) perceive them as dangerous, and (3) be pessimistic about the potential to 
change or improve their situation (Haslam and Kvaale, 2015). Thus, stigmatizing 
responses (prejudice and discrimination) may be sensitive to information about both the 
etiology and manageability (likely course and consequences) of voice-hearing. In view of 
this, we designed vignettes to reflect different approaches to understanding and helping 
people who hear voices, and to incorporate implications for management of their 
experiences (malleability) in addition to an explanation of etiology. We primarily draw on 
(biological, psychological, and biopsychosocial) models underpinning evidence-based 
approaches to understanding and helping, but also include a non-mental-health (spiritual) 
approach to represent (just one of the) alternative conceptualizations of voice-hearing that 
individuals may endorse (Corstens et al., 2014). 
2.3.2 Attribution Questionnaire. We adapted Corrigan et al.’s (2003) attribution 
questionnaire for use in the present study. The original questionnaire is widely used and 
assesses six different constructs: one cognitive attribution (personal responsibility), three 
emotional responses (anger, fear, and pity), and two behavioral intentions 
(helping/avoidant and coercion/segregation). Given that we aimed to assess a broader 
range of empirically and theoretically implicated attributions, emotional responses, and 
behavioral intentions, we made a number of modifications: (1) including items to capture 
additional attributions (locus of causality, controllability, dangerousness, stability over 
time, and globality across situations); (2) grouping ‘pity’ items into two separate emotional 
responses (‘sympathy/concern’ [empathic] versus ‘pity’ [belittling]) following analysis of 
pilot data, which suggested that these items formed two distinct constructs; (3) adding 
further items to gauge helping behavioral intentions (derived from Link et al., 1987). For 
measurement of the ‘locus of causality’ attribution, questions were adapted from a number 
of sources (Jorm and Griffiths, 2008; Martin et al., 2000) in order to assess whether 
participants attributed the cause of voice-hearing to internal or external factors. We added 
six items to capture locus of causality in terms of internal factors (‘own character’; 
‘chemical imbalance in his brain’; ‘genetic factors’) and external factors (‘upbringing’; 
‘stressful circumstances’; ‘God’s will’). Within the current study, all items were scored 
along scales ranging from 0 to 8, with higher scores indicating greater endorsement. The 
adapted questionnaire demonstrated good internal consistency, with alpha coefficients 
ranging from 0.70 to 0.96. 
 2.3.3 Behavioral Outcome Measure. To augment measurement of attitudes 
towards a (hypothetical) voice-hearer, we additionally embedded a relevant behavioral 
outcome measure – enabling us to examine correspondence between conjectural intentions 
and actual behavior (within constraints of the survey-based design). In this study, the 
behavioral outcome of interest was whether the participant would consent to being 
contacted directly by a voice-hearer – ostensibly regarding an opportunity to take part in 
further research (an interview-based study, conducted by a researcher who “has lifelong 
experience of voice-hearing himself and is interested in how people learn about voice-
hearing”). The invitation was made at the end of the survey, with answers restricted to a 
binary (yes/no) response. 
2.4 Procedure 
The survey was hosted online; the participant information sheet was provided on 
the introduction page and prospective participants were required to provide consent before 
continuing. Participants were directed to a page to create a personal identification code, 
which allowed them to withdraw their data from the study up to two weeks after 
completing the survey whilst maintaining their anonymity.  
After providing demographic information, participants were: (1) randomly assigned 
to one of the five vignettes; (2) invited to complete the adapted attribution questionnaire; 
(3) asked to respond to the behavioral outcome measure; and (4) fully debriefed. 
2.5 Analysis 
The primary aim was analyzed using a series of one-way between-groups 
ANOVAs. To account for multiple testing, Bonferroni corrections were applied to the 
alpha criterion; given that there were 12 separate ANOVAs, the alpha criterion was 
adjusted to 0.004 (i.e., 0.05/12). When assumptions for homogeneity were violated, the 
Brown-Forsyth F ratios were reported (Field, 2013). When assumptions for normality were 
violated, equivalent non-parametric tests were applied (e.g., Kruskal-Wallis). To test the 
model of attribution theory, a series of boot-strapped mediation analyses were performed 
(as outlined in Field, 2013).  
3. Results 
3.1 Sample characteristics 
1,004 participants completed the online measures. Age data were available for 854 
participants and ranged from 18-80 years old (Mean = 41.5 years; SD = 12.1). Seventy-
two percent of participants were female. Participants identified as White British (55%), 
British other (37%), European (2.1%), American/Canadian (1.7%), Australian/New 
Zealander (0.8%), Asian (0.3%), and ‘other’ (3.1%). Preliminary analysis revealed no 
significant differences between groups (vignette conditions) in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics, indicating that randomization achieved parity between groups on measured 
sample characteristics.   
3.2 Differential effects of voice-hearing explanations 
A series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted on the ‘locus of causality’ questions 
as a preliminary check to assess whether the provided explanations functioned to influence 
participants’ understanding of the etiology of voice-hearing in the expected manner (e.g., 
whether those participants who received the biological conceptualization were more likely 
to attribute the cause of voice-hearing to an internal biological state – e.g., a ‘chemical 
imbalance’). Significant between-explanation differences were identified for five out of the 
six ‘locus of causality’ questions: ‘Own character’, F (4, 999) = 5.39, p < 0.001; chemical 
imbalance, F (4, 999) = 13.89, p < 0.001; upbringing, F (4, 995) = 4.99, p = 0.001; 
stressful circumstances, F (4, 999) = 13.08, p < 0.001; and genetic, F (4, 999) = 15.07, p < 
0.001.  The variable ‘God’s will’ violated the assumption of normality and was 
consequently analyzed using the Kruskal-Wallis Test; after adjustment for multiple testing, 
no significant between-explanation differences were found for this variable, x
2 
= 14.15, p = 
0.007. Pairwise comparison analyses are presented in Table 1 and indicate that the 
explanations largely influenced participants as expected (i.e., the endorsed causality was 
congruent with the explanations that the participants received). 
 
Table 1 (a & b) here 
 
Having established that the explanations functioned as intended, a series of one-
way between-group ANOVAs was conducted to examine whether reported attributions 
(personal responsibility, dangerousness, controllability, stability, and globality), emotions 
(pity, sympathy/concern, anger, and fear), behavioral intentions (helping and coercive), 
and behavioral outcome were sensitive to the differential explanations (Table 2).  
  When analyzing the influence of explanations on attributions, no significant 
differences were identified between explanations in terms of: (a) ‘dangerousness’, F (4, 
999) = 1.65, p = 0.160;  (b) ‘controllability’, F (4, 999) = 3.18, p = 0.013; (c) ‘stability’,  F 
(4, 999) = 3.14, p = 0.014; or (d) ‘globality’,  F (4, 999) = 2.48, p = 0.043. However, a 
statistically significant difference was identified between explanations in terms of 
‘personal responsibility’, F (4, 999) = 4.27, p = 0.002. Despite reaching statistical 
significance, however, the magnitude of effect was small (ηp
2
 = 0.13).  Bonferroni-
adjusted post hoc comparisons indicated a significant difference between those receiving 
cognitive versus biological explanations: Relative to participants receiving the biological 
explanation (M = 0.78, SD = 1.17), participants receiving the cognitive explanation rated 
the voice-hearer as having greater personal responsibility for their voice-hearing 
experiences (M = 1.40, SD = 1.69; p = 0.001). No other post hoc comparisons for personal 
responsibility reached statistical significance. 
Emotional responses towards voice-hearers were not directly sensitive to 
differential explanations of voice-hearing: fear, F (4, 999) = 2.03, p = 0.088; anger, F (4, 
998) = 0.09, p = 0.986; pity, F (4, 999) = 3.84, p = 0.613; and concern/sympathy, F (4, 
999) = 3.05, p = 0.461. Similarly, no statistically-significant differences were observed 
between the explanations for: (a) helping behavioral intentions, F (4, 995) =1.69, p = 
0.150; (b) coercive behavioral intentions, F (4, 998) = 0.42, p = 0.795; or (c) the 
behavioral outcome measure, F (4, 999) = 0.63, p = 0.640.   
 
Table 2 here 
3.3 Test of the attribution model 
In order to test the pathways considered to underpin attribution theory (Figure 1), 
mediation analyses were undertaken using SPSS macros written by Preacher and Hayes 
(2008) outlined in Grist and Field (2012). Mediation describes the relationship between 
predictor variables (presently, cognitive attributions) and outcome variables (behavioral 
intentions), in terms of their relationship to the mediating variables (emotional responses). 
For each parameter, robust standard errors and bias-corrected confidence intervals were 
computed, based on 1,000 bootstrap samples; standardized estimates of direct and indirect 
effects were produced. Effects can be identified as statistically significant (at p ≤ 0.05) 
when bootstrapped confidence intervals do not include zero (i.e., the null value). The 
indirect effect estimates the influence of mediation. For the purpose of these analyses, all 
groups (explanatory conditions) were collapsed (i.e., analyses were conducted across the 
whole sample). 
Ten mediation analyses were conducted: five modelled helpful behavioral 
intentions as the outcome variable, again with separate models for each of the five 
attribution (explanatory) variables (dangerousness, controllability, personal responsibility, 
stability, and globality); a further five modelled coercive behavioral intentions as the 
outcome variable, again with separate models for each of the five attribution (explanatory) 
variables. In all models, four mediating variables (pity, concern/sympathy, anger, and fear) 
were entered together. 
  Eight of the ten mediation analyses supported the attribution model, 
demonstrating that the relationship between attributions and behavioral intentions was 
emotionally mediated. In addition to mediated (indirect) pathways, seven of these analyses 
also revealed significant direct effects of attributions on intentions (see Figure 2). The two 
mediation analyses examining the relationship between attributions of stability and 
behavioral intentions did not find any significant indirect effects (i.e., no emotional 
mediation was observed). Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of the mediation 
models under investigation, and depicts the strength and direction of pathways 
(standardized beta coefficients) between attributions, emotions, and behavioral intentions.  
As an extension of the models considered above, an analysis was undertaken to 
examine whether the behavioral intentions identified were related to the behavioral 
outcome measure – presently, whether participants would agree to be contacted by a voice-
hearer to discuss future research. Spearman correlations indicated a small-to-medium sized 
positive correlation between helping behavioral intentions and the behavioral outcome 
measure (rho = 0.247, n = 1,004, p < 0.001) and a small-to-medium negative correlation 
between coercive behavioral intentions and the same outcome measure (rho = -0.216 n = 
1,004, p < 0.001). 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
4. Discussion 
Our primary aim in this study was to examine whether attributions, emotional 
responses, and behavioral intentions towards voice-hearers are sensitive to differential 
explanations of voice-hearing.   
Attributions of ‘locus of causality’ were largely congruent with the particular 
explanations that participants received, affirming that these explanations influenced causal 
attributions in expected ways. For example, participants receiving the biological 
explanation showed a differential tendency to assign causality to internal (and specifically, 
biogenetic) factors: i.e., to a ‘chemical imbalance in the brain’ and ‘genetics’ (but not to 
the voice-hearer’s ‘own character’). Those receiving cognitive and stress-vulnerability 
explanations (i.e., those emphasizing psychosocial contributions) were more likely than 
others to assign causality to external factors: i.e., to the voice-hearer’s ‘upbringing’ and 
‘stressful circumstances’.   
Analysis revealed that attributions of ‘personal responsibility’ were also sensitive 
to the explanations offered: Specifically, relative to those receiving a cognitive 
explanation, those receiving the biological explanation considered the voice-hearer 
presented in the vignette to have less personal responsibility for their voice-hearing. This 
finding is partly consistent with previous research suggesting that biological explanations 
reduce attributions of personal responsibility, whereas psychosocial conceptualizations can 
increase them (Kvaale et al., 2013; Lincoln et al., 2008; Read, 2007). Importantly, 
however, neither conceptualization differed significantly from a control (non-explanatory) 
condition: Previous studies have identified that interpretation of differences between 
biological and psychosocial explanations are typically limited by a lack of a control 
comparator; in addressing this limitation, we found evidence to support relative rather than 
absolute effects of explanatory emphases. 
No other attributions showed sensitivity to the explanations offered. The finding 
that attributions of dangerousness were not sensitive to differential explanations was 
notably at odds with a recent meta-analysis (Kvaale et al., 2013), which concluded that 
attributions of dangerousness were sensitive to biological explanations. One hypothesis as 
to why the current study did not find any significant results for attributions of 
dangerousness may be due to the absence of psychiatric labels within the biological 
vignette and the fact that we provided a standardized ‘symptom-level’ (i.e., ‘voice-
hearing’) description across all vignettes. The results therefore appear to support findings 
from previous research (Lincoln et al., 2008) that suggests attributions of dangerousness 
may be accounted for by diagnostic labelling. This suggestion requires further exploration, 
but points to the potential usefulness of focusing on symptom-specific experiences in 
future anti-stigma research and messaging (rather than diagnoses). A recent large-scale 
experimental study (N = 2,265) by Imhoff (2015) demonstrated that, holding all other 
information constant, the addition of the diagnostic label ‘schizophrenia’ was sufficient to 
elevate perceptions of dangerousness and untrustworthiness, feelings of anxiety, and 
prognostic pessimism (with respect to a hypothetical case vignette). Evidence of the effect 
of labelling on public attitudes adds to an established literature demonstrating potential 
negative effects of diagnostic labelling on the diagnosed individual (in terms of perceived 
stigma, experienced stigma, and self-stigma)(Brohan et al., 2010). Although we highlight 
the potential usefulness of focusing on presenting concerns versus diagnoses, we 
acknowledge that the dominance of diagnostic language (in clinical and public discourse) 
would make this difficult to achieve in practice. 
The limited sensitivity of attributions to explanations may partly reflect the design 
of the study (e.g., the use of brief hypothetical vignettes). It is hypothesized that effects on 
attributions would be more apparent when information is (1) presented in formats that 
encourage greater personal engagement and depth of processing and/or (2) delivered in a 
more ecologically valid format (i.e., rather than in the context of a hypothetical case 
description). The lack of effect in the current study may partly reflect issues with vignette 
selection and construction. We chose to draw primarily on models that are compatible with 
current evidence-based approaches to helping people manage their voice-hearing 
experiences – this seemed appropriate to our focus on measuring intentions towards 
helping (versus coercing) responses, and we reasoned that explanations given to the public 
should ideally be consistent with explanations used in practice with voice-hearers. 
However, although we consider that attributions are likely to be shaped by information on 
both etiology and management (as discussed in the methods section) provision of 
information conflating cause and treatment may have masked differential effects. 
Furthermore, our selection of explanatory models is necessarily circumscribed and fails to 
reflect the range of potential explanations used by voice-hearers and practitioners working 
with voice-hearers. In particular, although our stress-vulnerability (biopsychosocial) 
vignette referred to the potential influence of “previous traumatic experiences”, trauma-
based understandings are gaining prominence as explanatory frameworks, and such models 
may warrant independent consideration in future research. Notwithstanding the caveats 
outlined above, evident effects on locus of causality suggest that the explanations 
presented in this study were not inert (they influenced attributed causes in meaningful and 
predictable ways).   
  The study found no direct effects of explanations on emotional responses, 
behavioral intentions, or behavioral outcome. Notwithstanding this, the study found 
support for indirect pathways through which emotional and behavioral responses may be 
influenced, via effects on attributions (consistent with the attribution theory model of 
attitudes) as discussed below. Thus, although effects on emotional and behavioral 
responses were not detected in the current study, observed relationships suggest that these 
responses could be altered through interventions that influence attributions (assuming, as 
the model does, that change in attributions would produce changes in emotional and 
behavioral sequelae). 
Our secondary aim was to test the attribution theory model and identify attributions 
and emotional mediators that influence behavioral intentions. Consistent with the model, 
analyses found a number of mediated pathways between attributions and intentions: 
Broadly, viewing the voice-hearer’s behavior as dangerous, being within their personal 
responsibility, and global (i.e., occurring across all situations) was associated with less 
helpful/more coercive intentions – and these associations were mediated by increased 
feelings of fear, anger, and pity (in contrast to previous literature, pity was negatively 
associated with helping in the current study – discussed further below).  
The study identified particularly strong (direct and indirect) associations between 
attributions of dangerousness and avoidant or coercive intentions. This has implications for 
challenging public perceptions of voice-hearers (or others who experience mental health 
issues) as inherently ‘dangerous’, and how media and anti-stigma campaigns describe the 
experiences of these individuals. The strength of pathways from personal responsibility 
and globality identify these attributions as additionally important targets for public 
messaging: For example, in the case of globality attributions, it would seem important to 
emphasize the contextual variability of voice-hearing experiences – e.g., that voices may 
‘come and go’ and be responsive to particular situational demands – and to avoid 
descriptions of these as invariant and dispositional phenomena. 
Fear was the emotional response most commonly implicated as mediating between 
attributions and behavioral intentions: Fear tended to increase in association with 
attributions of dangerousness, personal responsibility, globality, and controllability 
(pathway from attribution to emotion); and was associated with less helpful/more coercive 
intentions (pathway from emotion to behavioral intention). This finding is important to 
emphasize: Surprisingly, within attribution theory and research, fear has frequently been 
overlooked as a mediator of behavioral intention, with attribution theorists tending to 
highlight the primacy of anger and pity as emotions mediating behavioral intentions 
(Corrigan et al., 2003; Corrigan and Shapiro, 2010). The prominence of fear in the present 
study is consistent with broader empirical research implicating fear in discrimination 
against stigmatized individuals (Pescosolido et al., 2008).  
This study found that the emotional response of fear was present in eight out of the 
ten mediation analyses. Conversely, ‘sympathy/concern’ only emerged as an influential 
mediator in one mediation model and pity was implicated in only three of the mediation 
analyses. Many studies that have used the attribution questionnaire have grouped together 
pity, sympathy, and concern under one construct. However, in the current study, pity 
showed a greater association with anger than with feelings of sympathy/concern. This may 
be accounted for by semantic changes since the term was first used in attribution theory – 
when pity was considered synonymous with sympathy and compassion (Weiner et al., 
1982). It has been claimed that, in contemporary usage, the term pity is now associated 
with a feeling of superiority over the person being pitied (Goetz et al., 2010). We would 
hypothesize that this sense of difference (i.e., superiority) may be involved in the process 
of stigmatization, but this requires further exploration.  
Attribution theory is useful for understanding and predicting behavioral intentions; 
however, a common limitation of previous attribution research has been a failure to 
measure whether these intentions relate to actual behavioral outcomes. To augment the 
current study, we included a behavioral outcome measure and found a small-to-moderate 
relationship between reported intentions and behavior. 
Because participants were asked to respond to a hypothetical vignette, which was 
devoid of contextual factors (e.g., location, the voice-hearer’s behavioral presentation, 
likability, etc.), we cannot say with certainty whether participants would respond in the 
same way in real-life situations. We did examine whether hypothetical intentions were 
associated with a behavioral outcome measure, but the behavioral outcome measure may 
have been overly simplistic or transparent, with questionable ecological validity. 
Nonetheless, the presence (and magnitude) of the association between intentions and this 
outcome measure are notable, particularly given that this relationship was likely to be 
suppressed by additional factors: e.g., general willingness/time to engage in further 
research, and the discrepancy between the target of the reported intention towards voice-
hearers (hypothetical case of John within the vignettes) versus the target of the behavioral 
outcome (a researcher who hears voices) – we know that the intention-behavior 
relationship is stronger when both are expressed towards the same target (e.g., Ajzen and 
Madden, 1986). Future research would ideally link attitudinal assessments to behavioral 
outcomes, perhaps by ensuring that both relate to the same (real) individual. Within the 
present study, we were concerned that direct linkage would reduce credibility (participants 
would be more apt to guess that the behavioral outcome was also hypothetical/a 
continuation of the hitherto hypothetical responses). However, the association between 
behavioral intention (helping the hypothetical voice-hearer ‘John’) and behavioral outcome 
(consenting to be contacted by a researcher with experience of voice-hearing) may be 
explained by a third variable (e.g., general agreeableness) rather than reflecting the (target-
specific) pathways hypothesized within attribution theory. 
Our mediational analyses were guided by attribution theory and empirical findings 
from previous studies that offer support for posited pathways (Rudolph et al., 2004). 
However, it is important to stress that the models in the present study are based on cross-
sectional correlational data: Although we model specific sequential pathways, we are not 
able to establish temporal precedence or causal linkage, and associations may be inflated 
by common method variance and response sets (attributions, emotions, and intentions are 
all measured via self-report). Additionally, there may be important unmeasured variables 
that account for observed associations – indeed, recent research highlights the role of 
perceived difference as an additional determinant of stigmatizing responses which is 
related (and potentially primary) to attribution constructs (Corrigan et al., 2015). Our 
primary analyses (comparisons between conditions) are more apt to control for 
unmeasured differences (through randomization); the uncontrolled secondary analyses 
must be interpreted more cautiously. 
The findings from this study suggest that techniques and communications that seek 
to reduce attributions of responsibility might be expected to encourage more 
helpful/facilitative responses towards voice-hearers and other stigmatized groups. This is 
important in terms of public messaging/education, and also perhaps has implications for 
decreasing self-stigma in individuals who hear voices (Lebowitz, 2014). However, 
although reducing attributions of personal responsibility and control may be expected to 
diminish blame (an important component of stigma) it may also diminish the perception 
that an individual can achieve self-efficacy with respect to their voice-hearing experiences 
and any associated difficulties, leading to prognostic pessimism (another important 
component of stigma) which could inhibit helpful responses. Similarly, messages that 
lessen perceived controllability could elevate perceptions of unpredictability and 
dangerousness in a way that counteracts any benefit in decreasing blame. Stigma is a 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon, such that a given explanatory communication 
could have concurrently positive and negative effects on different aspects of stigma 
(Haslam and Kvaale, 2015). The clearest implication of this complexity is an obligation to 
be mindful of the explanations that we use and their various possible consequences (both 
intended and unintended) for shaping stigmatizing views and responses. We would expect 
that all explanatory frameworks have potential to be misconstrued or to promote unhelpful 
understandings (particularly when presented in simplified and reductive forms) suggesting 
a need for careful and nuanced communication (e.g., clarifying that individuals can be 
affected by factors outside of their control yet retain agency to effect changes and manage 
the impact of those factors) which may be difficult to achieve through traditional (broad 
and unidirectional) public health messaging.  
Moreover, the large-scale experimental nature of the present study may obfuscate 
an important factor in determining how explanatory communications are received 
(particularly for people who are experts by experience): that is, the existing explanations 
that they draw upon. Although this study controlled for existing differences (through 
randomization) to examine aggregate-level effects over and above these differences, we 
would in practice want to know how offered explanations interact with extant 
explanations. With respect to voice-hearing, we know that voice-hearers draw on a 
multiplicity of explanatory frameworks for understanding their own experiences (Corstens 
et al., 2014); where these understandings are helpful, the imposition of other (perhaps 
contradictory) accounts could have invalidating and detrimental effects. Additional work is 
needed for us to understand how the impact of messaging may vary according to pre-
existing explanations, and how different explanations can be helpfully integrated in 
practice (e.g., in clinical work with voice-hearers who have developed their own 
understandings of voice-hearing). 
Further and more nuanced examination is required if we are to develop a fuller 
understanding of how accounts of ‘mental health’ can shape public, personal, and 
professional perspectives on these phenomena. Moreover, understanding of these accounts 
and their implications is insufficient: We need to consider the practical difficulties of 
implementing changes in our communications around ‘mental health’. For example, 
explanations may differ both within and between services and professional groupings, 
making it difficult to develop consensus or consistency in communication (within clinical 
or public information contexts). Ultimately, broader implementation research will be 
needed to consider how efficacious messaging can be translated into effective practices. 
  
Declaration: On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no 
conflict of interest.  
References 
 
Abramson, L.Y., Seligman, M.E., Teasdale, J.D., 1978. Learned helplessness in humans: 
critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 87 (1), 49. 
Ajzen, I., Madden, T.J., 1986. Prediction of goal-directed behavior: Attitudes, intentions, 
and perceived behavioral control. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 22 
(5), 453-474. 
American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013. Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders, (DSM-5). American Psychiatric Publications Inc. 
Angermeyer, M.C., Buyantugs, L., Kenzine, D., Matschinger, H., 2004. Effects of 
labelling on public attitudes towards people with schizophrenia: are there cultural 
differences? Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 109 (6), 420-425. 
Angermeyer, M.C., Dietrich, S., 2006. Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people 
with mental illness: a review of population studies. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 
113 (3), 163-179. 
Angermeyer, M.C., Holzinger, A., Carta, M.G., Schomerus, G., 2011. Biogenetic 
explanations and public acceptance of mental illness: systematic review of 
population studies. The British Journal of Psychiatry 199 (5), 367-372. 
Anthony, D., 2004. The cognitive neuropsychiatry of auditory verbal hallucinations: an 
overview. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 9 (1-2), 107-123. 
Bannatyne, A.J., Abel, L.M., 2015. Can we fight stigma with science? The effect of 
aetiological framing on attitudes towards anorexia nervosa and the impact on 
volitional stigma. Australian Journal of Psychology 67 (1), 38-46. 
Beavan, V., Read, J., 2010. Hearing voices and listening to what they say: The importance 
of voice content in understanding and working with distressing voices. The Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease 198 (3), 201-205. 
Beavan, V., Read, J., Cartwright, C., 2011. The prevalence of voice-hearers in the general 
population: a literature review. Journal of Mental Health 20 (3), 281-292. 
Beck, A.T., Rush, A.J., Shaw, B.F., Emery, G., 1979. Cognitive therapy of depression. 
Guilford Press, UK. 
Bentall, R.P., 1990. The illusion of reality: a review and integration of psychological 
research on hallucinations. Psychological Bulletin 107 (1), 82. 
Birchwood, M., Gilbert, P., Gilbert, J., Trower, P., Meaden, A., Hay, J., Murray, E., Miles, 
J.N., 2004. Interpersonal and role-related schema influence the relationship with 
the dominant ‘voice’in schizophrenia: a comparison of three models. Psychological 
Medicine 34 (08), 1571-1580. 
Brohan, E., Slade, M., Clement, S., Thornicroft, G., 2010. Experiences of mental illness 
stigma, prejudice and discrimination: a review of measures. BMC Health Services 
Research 10 (1), 80. 
Butzlaff, R.L., Hooley, J.M., 1998. Expressed emotion and psychiatric relapse: a meta-
analysis. Archives of General Psychiatry 55 (6), 547-552. 
Chadwick, P., Birchwood, M., 1994. The omnipotence of voices. A cognitive approach to 
auditory hallucinations. The British Journal of Psychiatry 164 (2), 190-201. 
Corrigan, P.W., 2000. Mental health stigma as social attribution: Implications for research 
methods and attitude change. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 7 (1), 48-
67. 
Corrigan, P.W., Bink, A.B., Fokuo, J.K., Schmidt, A., 2015. The public stigma of mental 
illness means a difference between you and me. Psychiatry Research 226 (1), 186-
191. 
Corrigan, P.W., Markowitz, F.E., Watson, A., Rowan, D., Kubiak, M.A., 2003. An 
attribution model of public discrimination towards persons with mental illness. 
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 162-179. 
Corrigan, P.W., Shapiro, J.R., 2010. Measuring the impact of programs that challenge the 
public stigma of mental illness. Clinical Psychology Review 30 (8), 907-922. 
Corstens, D., Longden, E., McCarthy-Jones, S., Waddingham, R., Thomas, N., 2014. 
Emerging perspectives from the Hearing Voices Movement: implications for 
research and practice. Schizophrenia Bulletin 40 (Suppl 4), S285-S294. 
Dietrich, S., Beck, M., Bujantugs, B., Kenzine, D., Matschinger, H., Angermeyer, M.C., 
2004. The relationship between public causal beliefs and social distance toward 
mentally ill people. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 38 (5), 348-
354. 
Field, A., 2013. Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics. SAGE, UK. 
Garety, P.A., 2003. The future of psychological therapies for psychosis. World Psychiatry 
2 (3), 147. 
Goetz, J.L., Keltner, D., Simon-Thomas, E., 2010. Compassion: an evolutionary analysis 
and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin 136 (3), 351. 
Grist, R.M., Field, A.P., 2012. The mediating effect of cognitive development on 
children's worry elaboration. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry 43 (2), 801-807. 
Haslam, N., Kvaale, E.P., 2015. Biogenetic Explanations of Mental Disorder: The Mixed-
Blessings Model. Current Directions in Psychological Science 24 (5), 399-404. 
Hayward, M., Strauss, C., McCarthy-Jones, S., 2014. Psychological approaches to 
understanding and treating auditory hallucinations: From theory to therapy. 
Routledge, Hove. 
Imhoff, R., 2015. Zeroing in on the Effect of the Schizophrenia Label on Stigmatizing 
Attitudes: A Large-scale Study. Schizophrenia Bulletin. 
Johns, L.C., Nazroo, J.Y., Bebbington, P., Kuipers, E., 2002. Occurrence of hallucinatory 
experiences in a community sample and ethnic variations. The British Journal of 
Psychiatry 180 (2), 174-178. 
Jorm, A.F., Griffiths, K.M., 2008. The public’s stigmatizing attitudes towards people with 
mental disorders: how important are biomedical conceptualizations? Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica 118 (4), 315-321. 
Jorm, A.F., Reavley, N.J., Ross, A.M., 2012. Belief in the dangerousness of people with 
mental disorders: a review. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 46 
(11), 1029-1045. 
Klare, G.R., 1974. Assessing readability. Reading Research Quarterly 10, 62-102. 
Kvaale, E.P., Haslam, N., Gottdiener, W.H., 2013. The ‘side effects’ of medicalization: A 
meta-analytic review of how biogenetic explanations affect stigma. Clinical 
Psychology Review 33 (6), 782-794. 
Lebowitz, M.S., 2014. Biological conceptualizations of mental disorders among affected 
individuals: A review of correlates and consequences. Clinical Psychology: 
Science and Practice 21 (1), 67-83. 
Lebowitz, M.S., Ahn, W., 2014. Combining biomedical accounts of mental disorders with 
treatability information to reduce mental illness stigma. Psychiatric Services 63 (5), 
496-499. 
Leudar, I., Thomas, P., 2000. Voices of reason. Voices of Insanity: Studies of verbal 
hallucinations. Brunner-Routledge, London. 
Lincoln, T.M., Arens, E., Berger, C., Rief, W., 2008. Can antistigma campaigns be 
improved? A test of the impact of biogenetic vs psychosocial causal explanations 
on implicit and explicit attitudes to schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin 34 (5), 
984-994. 
Link, B.G., Cullen, F.T., Frank, J., Wozniak, J.F., 1987. The social rejection of former 
mental patients: Understanding why labels matter. American Journal of Sociology, 
1461-1500. 
Link, B.G., Phelan, J.C., Bresnahan, M., Stueve, A., Pescosolido, B.A., 1999. Public 
conceptions of mental illness: labels, causes, dangerousness, and social distance. 
American Journal of Public Health 89 (9), 1328-1333. 
Link, B.G., Yang, L.H., Phelan, J.C., Collins, P.Y., 2004. Measuring mental illness stigma. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 30 (3), 511-541. 
Magliano, L., Fiorillo, A., De Rosa, C., Malangone, C., Maj, M., 2004. Beliefs about 
schizophrenia in Italy: a comparative nationwide survey of the general public, 
mental health professionals, and patients' relatives. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 
49 (5), 322-330. 
Martin, J.K., Pescosolido, B.A., Tuch, S.A., 2000. Of fear and loathing: the role of 
'disturbing behavior' labels and causal attributions in shaping public attitudes 
toward people with mental illness. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 208-223. 
McCarthy-Jones, S., Waegeli, A., Watkins, J., 2013. Spirituality and hearing voices: 
considering the relation. Psychosis 5 (3), 247-258. 
Morrison, A.P., Frame, L., Larkin, W., 2003. Relationships between trauma and psychosis: 
a review and integration. British Journal of Clinical Psychology 42 (4), 331-353. 
Morrison, A.P., Haddock, G., 1997. Cognitive factors in source monitoring and auditory 
hallucinations. Psychological Medicine 27 (03), 669-679. 
Moskowitz, A., Corstens, D., Kent, J., 2011. What can auditory hallucinations tell us about 
the dissociative nature of personality?, in: Sinason, V. (Ed.), Trauma, Dissociation 
and Multiplicity: Working on Identity and Selves. Routledge, London, UK, pp. 22-
35. 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence [NICE], 2010. Schizophrenia (updated), 
NICE Guidance/Clinical Guidelines. 
Pescosolido, B.A., Martin, J.K., Lang, A., Olafsdottir, S., 2008. Rethinking theoretical 
approaches to stigma: A framework integrating normative influences on stigma 
(FINIS). Social Science and Medicine 67 (3), 431-440. 
Preacher, K.J., Hayes, A.F., 2008. Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and 
comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research 
Methods 40 (3), 879-891. 
Rao, H., Mahadevappa, H., Pillay, P., Sessay, M., Abraham, A., Luty, J., 2009. A study of 
stigmatized attitudes towards people with mental health problems among health 
professionals. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 16 (3), 279-284. 
Read, J., 2007. Why promoting biological ideology increases prejudice against people 
labelled “schizophrenic”. Australian Psychologist 42 (2), 118-128. 
Reber, A.S., Reber, E., 1995. Dictionary of Psychology, 2nd ed. Penguin, UK. 
Rudolph, U., Roesch, S., Greitemeyer, T., Weiner, B., 2004. A meta‐analytic review of 
help giving and aggression from an attributional perspective: Contributions to a 
general theory of motivation. Cognition and Emotion 18 (6), 815-848. 
Schulze, B., Angermeyer, M.C., 2003. Subjective experiences of stigma. A focus group 
study of schizophrenic patients, their relatives and mental health professionals. 
Social Science and Medicine 56 (2), 299-312. 
Thomas, N., Hayward, M., Peters, E., van der Gaag, M., Bentall, R.P., Jenner, J., Strauss, 
C., Sommer, I.E., Johns, L.C., Varese, F., 2014. Psychological therapies for 
auditory hallucinations (voices): current status and key directions for future 
research. Schizophrenia Bulletin 40 (Suppl), S202-S212. 
Thomas, P., Leudar, I., 1996. Verbal hallucinations or hearing voices: What does the 
experience signify? Journal of Mental Health 5 (3), 215-218. 
Tien, A.Y., 1991. Distribution of hallucinations in the population. Social Psychiatry and 
Psychiatric Epidemiology 26 (6), 287-292. 
Waters, F., Allen, P., Aleman, A., Fernyhough, C., Woodward, T.S., Badcock, J.C., 
Barkus, E., Johns, L., Varese, F., Menon, M., 2012. Auditory hallucinations in 
schizophrenia and nonschizophrenia populations: a review and integrated model of 
cognitive mechanisms. Schizophrenia Bulletin 38 (4), 683-693. 
Weiner, B., 1979. A theory of motivation for some classroom experiences. Journal of 
Educational Psychology 71 (1), 3. 
Weiner, B., 1980. A cognitive (attribution)-emotion-action model of motivated behavior: 
An analysis of judgments of help-giving. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 39 (2), 186. 
Weiner, B., 1985. An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. 
Psychological Review 92 (4), 548. 
Weiner, B., 1995. Judgements of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social 
conduct. Guilford Press, USA. 
Weiner, B., Graham, S., Chandler, C., 1982. Pity, Anger, and Guilt: An Attributional 
Analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8 (2), 226-232. 
Weiner, B., Nierenberg, R., Goldstein, M., 1976. Social learning (locus of control) versus 
attributional (causal stability) interpretations of expectancy of success. Journal of 
Personality 44 (1), 52-68. 
Zubin, J., Spring, B., 1977. Vulnerability: a new view of schizophrenia. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology 86 (2), 103. 
 
 Figure 1. Overview of the attribution model (based on pathways outlined by Corrigan, 
2000) 
  





Note. *significant pathway at p < .05 
Figure 2. Mediation models depicting pathways between attributions and behavioural 
intentions.  
 
 Table 1a 
Descriptive statistics and between-condition comparisons for Internal Locus of Causality 
attributions 
Internal Locus of 






Own Character Control 2.10 (1.99) Control > Biological 0.30* 
 Biological 1.53   (1.81) Cognitive > 
Biological 
0.40** 
 Cognitive 2.31   (2.07) Stress > Biological 0.41** 
 Stress 2.35   (2.19)    
 Spiritual 2.02 (2.15)   
Chemical Imbalance Control 4.85 (2.04) Control > Cognitive 0.30* 
 Biological 5.56 (2.16) Biological > 
Cognitive 
0.63** 
 Cognitive 4.23 (2.06) Biological > Stress 0.58** 
 Stress 4.26 (2.37) Biological > Spiritual 0.50** 
 Spiritual 4.47 (2.19)  Biological > Control 0.34* 
Genetic Control 3.48 (2.12) Biological > 
Cognitive 
0.66** 
 Biological 4.72 (2.12) Biological > Stress 0.60** 
 Cognitive 3.37 (1.98) Biological > Spiritual 0.49** 
 Stress 3.49 (2.01) Biological > Control 0.59** 
 Spiritual 3.70 (2.10)   
Note. Stress = Stress-vulnerability (biopsychosocial) explanatory condition   
Table 1b 
Descriptive statistics and between-condition comparisons for External Locus of Causality 
attributions 
External Locus of 






Upbringing Control 2.61 (2.13) Control > Biological 0.27* 
 Biological 2.04 (2.10) Stress > Biological 0.42** 
 Cognitive 2.70 (2.07)   
 Stress 2.93 (2.17)   
 Spiritual 2.51 (2.05)   
Stressful Life Experiences Control 4.68 (1.84) Stress > Control 0.44* 
 Biological 4.24 (2.03) Cognitive > 
Biological 
0.38* 
 Cognitive 4.97 (1.78) Cognitive > Spiritual 0.30* 
 Stress 5.44 (1.67) Stress > Biological 0.64** 
 Spiritual 4.42 (1.91) Stress > Spiritual 0.57** 
God’s Will Control 0.37 (1.32) Spiritual > Cognitive 0.31* 
 Biological 0.44 (1.36) Spiritual > Stress 0.29* 
 Cognitive 0.24 (0.87)   
 Stress 0.25 (1.05)   
 Spiritual 0.63 (1.55)   
      
      
  
Table 2 
Mean (SD) scores for attributions, emotions, and behavioral responses within each 
explanatory condition 
 Explanatory Condition 
 Control Biological Cognitive Stress Spiritual 
 (n=187) (n=216) (n=199) (n=192) (n=210) 
Attributions      
Personal Responsibility 1.25 (1.64) .78 (1.17) 1.40 (1.69) 1.14 (1.70) 1.12 (1.63) 
Controllability 2.81 (2.33) 3.24 (2.27) 3.50 (2.21) 3.42 (2.23) 3.02 (2.16) 
Dangerousness 2.33 (2.15) 2.42 (1.92) 2.24 (1.97) 2.23 (2.05) 2.16 (1.86) 
Globality 2.15 (2.09) 2.57 (2.12) 2.27 (1.85) 2.11 (1.89) 2.57 (2.14) 
Stability 4.49 (1.91) 4.05 (2.13) 4.58 (1.93) 4.64 (1.85) 4.59 (1.96) 
Emotions      
Fear 2.25 (1.99) 1.77 (1.99) 1.80 (1.87) 1.81 (1.96) 2.00 (2.03) 
Anger 1.25 (1.57) 1.20 (1.53) 1.23 (1.43) 1.23 (1.52) 1.18 (1.44) 
Pity 3.30 (2.46) 3.35 (2.41) 3.16 (2.36) 3.10 (2.38) 3.02 (2.36) 
Sympathy 5.64 (1.77) 5.64 (1.81) 5.39 (1.85) 5.57 (1.84) 5.40 (1.90) 
Behavioral Intentions      
Helping 5.24 (1.92) 5.70 (1.76) 5.48 (1.68) 5.44 (1.92) 5.44 (1.74) 
Coercive 1.07 (1.54) .97 (1.41) 0.92 (1.30) 0.90 (1.37) 0.96 (1.26) 
Behavioral Outcome 0.27 (0.45) 0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 
Note. Attributions, emotions, and behavioral intentions were scored 0-8 with higher scores 
indicating greater endorsement. The Behavioral Outcome measure was dichotomous, 
scored as 0 = refusal to be contacted by a voice-hearer and 1 = providing consent to be 
contacted. 
Highlights 
- Vignettes successfully primed differential understandings of voice-hearing etiology 
- Cognitive (relative to biological) explanations of voice-hearing augmented blame  
- Perceived dangerousness increased negative intentions towards voice-hearers 
- Reported behavioral intentions were associated with our behavioral outcome 
measure 
 
